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Abstract 
Whistle-blowing has long been an important organizational phenomenon that improves organizations 
in the long-run. Online whistle-blowing systems are becoming increasingly prevalent channels for 
reporting organizational abuses. Given that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and similar financial laws 
throughout the world require multi-national firms to establish whistle-blowing procedures and 
systems, whistle-blowing research is even more important (Ernst & Young 2009). Existing whistle-
blowing theory does not explicitly predict risk, trust, cross-cultural considerations, nor use of 
anonymous, online whistle-blowing systems. Yet, all of these are key considering in the whistle-
blowing act and whistle-blowing in general. Furthermore, unless these systems are further 
understood, they may not be used, or they may not be used properly. This is a particular problem for 
multi-national financial firms that increasingly need to comply with whistle-blowing regulations. 
This research-in-process paper details our plans to create and extend baseline whistle-blowing 
theory, by uniquely considering anonymity, risk, trust, and cross-cultural considerations in using 
whistle-blowing systems. The model will be rigorously testing using working professionals in the 
USA, Middle East, and China. We propose our design and measures for testing the model. 
 
Keywords: Whistle blowing, whistle blowing systems, culture, Middle East, China, USA, anonymity, 
trust, risk, cross-cultural comparisons 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
A persistent global problem receiving increasing attention is organizational fraud and abuse (Bowen, 
Call, & Rajgopal, 2010). A key means of uncovering such fraud and abuse is through whistle-blowing 
(WB), which is “the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or 
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be 
able to effect action” (1995, p. 680). WB is a high-risk organizational phenomenon that is 
misunderstood because it actually improves organizations and society in the long-run, and thus is 
considered increasingly important in practice and in the literature (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008; 
Near & Miceli, 1995).  
To better understand what predicts WB of organizational abuse, researchers have developed whistle-
blowing theory (WBT) (Near & Miceli, 1985). A key distinction of WBT is that it explains that an 
individual does not choose to whistle-blow based on a cost-benefit calculus because there are few, if 
any, personal benefits of WB. In fact, the risk of verbal abuse, intimidation, and being fired are very 
high for whistle-blowers in large organizations—despite the many global regulations protecting them 
(Bowen, et al., 2010). Instead, WBT focuses on whether someone determines something to be worthy 
of reporting and whether or not that person believes he or she has a personal responsibility to whistle-
blow following an incident. Examples of applications of this theory include reporting bad news in 
problematic software projects and reluctance around software project problem escalation (Keil, Im, & 
Mähring, 2007; Keil, et al., 2010).  
In recent years, legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States and similar legislation 
in other countries have required multinational public companies to establish channels through which 
whistle-blowers can anonymously report abuses (Bowen, et al., 2010; Ernst & Young, 2009). For 
succinctness, we term the full range of organizational fraud, abuse, misconduct, deviance, and 
unethical behaviour as organizational abuse.  
Although an established stream of research has developed WBT to explain conventional WB 
behaviour, this theory is not designed to explain the use of anonymous WB reporting systems 
(WBRS) —a unique phenomenon that introduces a unique set of factors that challenge organizations. 
Unless these systems are further understood, they may not be used, or they may not be used properly. 
WBRS allow users to submit WB reports anonymously online via the Web from any place that has 
Internet connectivity. WBRS are differentiated from traditional means and non-computerized systems 
of WB—such as telephone hotlines and post office boxes—because they require interaction with a 
system, which introduces a unique set of user perceptions (Moore & Benbasat, 1991). Further, 
research on mediation communications has found that increased distance and technology mediation 
between the communicators makes it more difficult to communicate. Specifically, communicators 
have more difficulty in creating a shared context and transferring information, and are prone to 
experience more conflict within their relationship (Hinds & Bailey, 2003; Hinds & Mortensen, 2005). 
The increased difficulty in creating a shared context and transferring information increases the 
likelihood of miscommunication (Rogers & Lea, 2005), thus undermining the effectiveness of such 
systems. Given the even sharing of information, increased likelihood of conflict, and a lack of a 
shared context, WBRS have additional hurdles to overcome than the traditional means for WB.  
By using WBRS, additional issues related to trust and risk need to be considered that provide for 
several compelling organizational research opportunities. First, though anonymity is assumed to be a 
critical part of WBRS requirements (Ernst & Young, 2009), extant WBT does not directly address 
anonymity. Second, though people are believed to be more likely to whistle-blow if they feel they can 
trust the authority to which they report (Smith & Keil, 2003), trust in the receiving authority or in the 
WBRS itself has not been directly model in extant WBT though it is implied throughout the literature. 
Third, though perceived risk of reporting is central to WB because of the high-risk nature of WB 
(Miceli & Near, 1984; Miceli & Near, 1985), risk is not explicitly modelled (but again is extensively 
implied and assumed) in extant WBT and is potentially increased through WBRS use. Fourth, the 
factors have not been considered together in a cross-cultural context, which is increasingly important 
3 
 
because global WB laws apply to a large portion of multi-national companies where culture could 
come in conflict with WBRS use. 
Given these compelling gaps in the extant WB literature, our research objectives are as follows: (1) 
Establish risk of reporting and risk to the employee’s organization as key risk determinants of WB; 
(2) Establish disposition to trust, trust in the reporting tool, and trust in the report-receiving party as 
the key elements of trust in WB; (3) Establish how the five dimensions of anonymity affect risk, trust, 
and willingness to whistle blow; (4) Establish how the cross-cultural dimensions of power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, collectivism-individualism all affect risk, trust, and willingness to WB. 
2 BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
Given these compelling gaps in extant WBT, we have preliminarily extended WBT to explicitly 
account for anonymity, trust, and risk, and have done so in the highly salient context of use of WBRS. 
The initial model that we have validated with preliminary data from 200 working professionals in the 
USA is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Preliminary Whistle-Blowing Model Validated with Preliminary USA-Based Data 
The biggest limitation of the extant work in this area is that it has focused primarily on Western 
culture. This is particularly limiting considering that culture greatly influences attitudes and 
behaviours. In reviewing the literature further, we have discovered that both trust and risk—key 
foundations of the extended WB model—both are strongly influenced by cross-cultural considerations 
(e.g., Lowry, et al., 2010). Our plan is thus to create a cross-cultural WB model that can better account 
for the whistle blowing of participants from various cultures. The primary targets for our first round of 
research are the highly collectivist Middle-Eastern Arab professionals working in Kuwait and highly 
collectivist Chinese professionals working in China—versus highly individualist professionals 
working in the USA. 
Prior research has theoretically and empirically demonstrated the pivotal importance of culture in 
information-based organizational environments (Lowry, Cao, & Everard, 2011; Lowry, et al., 2010; 
Posey, et al., 2010; Zhang & Lowry, 2008; Zhang, et al., 2007). The reasons for these differences are 
well-founded in theory and empirical studies on differences in collectivism-individualism (Middle 
Easterners and Chinese being more collectivistic; Westerners being more individualistic); uncertainty 
avoidance (Middle Easterners and Chinese desiring to avoid uncertainty more than Westerners); and 
power distance (Middle Easterners and Chinese embracing more rigid lines between people of 
different status, power, and rank than Westerners).  
In this study, we plan on fully validating our previous (Figure 1) model with an extensive study of 
professionals’ behaviour with WB. In addition, we are adding cross-cultural considerations on WB, as 
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designed for comparing highly collectivist cultures versus highly individualist cultures. In doing so, 
we have proposed several new hypotheses to extend our model for this context. Figure 2 summarizes 
this new model. 
The first seven hypotheses are manipulation-checks that explain based on well-established cross-
cultural literature which participants will be higher and lower in which cross-cultural dimensions 
(e.g., Lowry, et al., 2011; Lowry, et al., 2010; Posey, et al., 2010; Srite & Karahanna, 2006; Zhang & 
Lowry, 2008; Zhang, et al., 2007). Based on these manipulations, we will test the path model with our 
cross-cultural extensions that are shaded in grey in Figure 2. Based on the extant literature, we predict 
participants with higher levels of collectivism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance will 
perceive higher risk of reporting organizational abuse through WB. Participants that are higher in 
collectivism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance will have higher trust in the report-receiving 
authority and trust in the reporting tool. 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
We will test our newly proposed model using two methodologies that test the same model. The first 
method will involve an online experiment to test participants’ willingness to whistle blow, based on a 
hypothetical vignette. The second method will be an anonymous survey of working professionals’ 
actual experiences with whistle blowing. The measures for both studies will be the same. The only 
difference will be that the first study is hypothetical whistle blowing, based on vignettes, and the 
second is a survey of actual whistle blowing. Because of the similarities of the two studies, for brevity 
we only explicate the more complicated study involving vignettes—the first study. 
The first study will be an online experiment, grounded in a WB context of the highly salient 
organizational abuse context of computer abuse. Computer abuse is “the unauthorized and deliberate 
misuse of assets of the local organizational information system by individuals” (Straub, 1990, p. 257). 
We choose computer abuse because it is a current problem that is pervasive in organizations and 
widely known and understood (D' Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Posey, et al., 2011). Computer 
abuse covers everything from misuse of computers at work (e.g., surfing for porn, playing games, and 
the like), intentionally misrepresenting system data, using organizational systems for personal profit, 
leaking classified information, to hacking into systems.  
To test whistle blowing in a computer-abuse context, we will use a hypothetical scenario method (i.e., 
vignette method) to provide the treatments of our online experiment. This approach well established 
in studies involving questions of unethical, antisocial, deviant, and criminal behaviour. This method is 
likewise used frequently in management studies of computer-related abuse and ethics issues (e.g., 
Siponen & Vance, 2010).  
3.1 Scenario Design 
For increased generalizability, we have already created and pretested scenarios that were applied to 
actual working professionals who had to respond to a randomized, hypothetical scenario of disclosing 
computer abuse through a specialized reporting system in a professional setting. Our vignettes are 
carefully created to randomly manipulate six independent variables with two conditions each 
(riskiness of scenario, privacy/identification, diffused responsibility, proximity, knowledge of others, 
and confidence in the reporting system) to represent a range of risk and various circumstances under 
which the reporting would occur. Every manipulation will be randomized by the survey software to 
create one of 64 potential vignettes for each participant.  
  
Figure 2. Proposed Cross-Cultural Collectivistic-Individualistic Model for this Study) 
3.2 Scenario Testing and Pilot Test 
Two rounds of data collection and expert analysis were already conducted to create appropriate 
scenarios that could be used to manipulate the independent variables (IVs) realistically. We first 
adapted and expanded on scenarios from Siponen and Vance (2010) to create a list of risky computer 
abuse scenarios. We then had 15 graduate students with work experience to use the risk scale from the 
study to rate the degree to which they believed each scenario was risky. We chose the two scenarios 
that were deemed to be the statistically least and most risky from this study so that perceived risk 
would be varied in the study (the least risky was playing a game on a computer during a company 
meeting; the most risky was hacking into a system). We also created wording to represent the five 
levels of anonymity that we will manipulate, according to the theory and instrumentation set forth by 
Pinsonneault and Heppel (1998). We had five experts review these manipulations to ensure that the 
manipulations were true to the underlying theoretical meaning of the anonymity subconstructs. We 
also adopted several of the experts’ helpful wording suggestions. We have already pilot-tested the 
USA portion of the study using 148 graduate students with work experience at a large public 
university in the eastern United States. We also have validated the initial model in Figure 1 with 200 
working professionals in the USA. 
3.3 Participants 
Each of two studies will involve 400 participants, for a total of 1200 participants. Each study will 
target 200 working Arab professionals in Kuwait, 200 working professionals in China, and 200 
working professional in the USA. Each participant will only be allowed to participate in one study, 
and must be working full-time in jobs that involve some degree of computer use.  
3.4 Measures 
All of the measures for this study will be taken from established, published measures. In the pre-
experiment data, we will gather background data on an individual’s disposition to trust (McKnight, 
Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002) the degree to which he or she has tendencies toward ethical formalism 
(Schminke & Wells, 1999), and the pertinent cross-cultural measures on power-distance, collectivism-
individualism, and uncertainty avoidance (Srite & Karahanna, 2006). After participants receive and 
process their randomized scenarios, they will fill out the post-experiment scales. These included risk 
beliefs of the scenario and risk beliefs of reporting the incident (Jarvenpaa & Tractinsky, 1999; 
Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal, 2004), public self-awareness (Pinsonneault & Heppel, 1998), the five 
anonymity subconstructs (Pinsonneault & Heppel, 1998), belief that the problem ought to be reported 
(Park, Im, & Keil, 2008), perceived responsibility to report the incident (Park, et al., 2008), 
willingness to report the incident (Park, et al., 2008), trusting beliefs (McKnight, et al., 2002), and 
trust in the computer-abuse reporting tool (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2000). In addition to these measures, 
we will gather several covariates from the literature.  
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